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Abstract
In this paper we analyze career dynamics for US workers who have more schooling than
their peers in the same occupation. We use data from the NLSY79 combined with the
CPS to analyze transitions into and out of overeducated employment, together with
the corresponding effects on wages. Overeducation is a fairly persistent phenomenon
at the aggregate and individual levels, with 66% of workers remaining overeducated
after 1 year. Overeducation is not just more common but also more persistent among
blacks and low-AFQT individuals. Further, the hazard rate out of overeducation drops
by about 60% during the first 5 years spent overeducated. However, the estimation of a
mixed proportional hazard model suggests that this is attributable to selection on
unobservables rather than true duration dependence. Lastly, overeducation is
associated with lower current as well as future wages, consistent with scarring effects.
JEL Classification: J24, I21
Keywords: Human capital, Earnings dynamics, Overeducation
1 Introduction
As American students accumulate college loan debt (1.08 trillion dollars as of December
31, 2013, Source: NY Fed), there is a growing concern that expensive skills acquired in col-
legemay be underutilized in low-paying jobs. Existing studies estimate that around a third
of American workers are “overeducated”—i.e., have more schooling than is necessary for
their job.1 These would include, for example, a college graduate working as a cashier in
a store. Estimated wage returns to this surplus schooling average 4.3%, or about half of
the returns to required schooling. Thus, schooling mismatch appears to be an important
source of the ex post heterogeneity in returns to schooling documented in the literature
(see, e.g., Carneiro et al., 2003). At the aggregate level, overeducation could reflect skill
mismatch and an inefficient allocation of workers to jobs.
What cross-sectional data miss is the possibility that overeducated workers may only be
temporarily underemployed before switching to a job that requires their level of school-
ing. Further, low unobserved ability, compensating non-pecuniary job characteristics
and career mobility considerations could rationalize apparent overeducation without the
implication of a suboptimal schooling choice.2 In order to understand how much of a
problem overeducation really is, it is crucial to go beyond the cross-sectional stylized facts
and investigate longitudinal patterns.
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Clark et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2017) 6:3 Page 2 of 29
This paper provides the first analysis of the career dynamics of overeducated US work-
ers. Specifically, we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79),
combined with the pooled 1989–1991 waves of the Current Population Survey (CPS), to
examine how overeducated employment spells persist, exhibit duration dependence, and
are associated with future wages. Most of our analysis will focus on the causes and conse-
quences of overeducated employment among 2- and 4-year college graduates, who make
up the bulk of overeducated workers.3
While the literature has paid comparatively little attention to the longitudinal dimen-
sion, analyzing transitions into and out of overeducated employment, together with their
effects on wages, is key to disentangling the role played by labor market frictions versus
other theories of overeducation.4 For example, if overeducation was due only to search
frictions, one would expect this type of mismatch to be transitory and concentrated early
in the career. Conversely, selection on ability, compensating wage differentials or career
mobility motives would generate persistence in the overeducation patterns.5 The indi-
vidual persistence and duration dependence of overeducated employment, together with
the wage penalties associated with it, are also important for the design of unemployment
insurance and training programs. For instance, encouraging early exit from unemploy-
mentmay pushmore workers into overeducated work with potentially negative long-term
effects on earnings.
The question of overeducation was first brought to the attention of economists
and policymakers by Freeman (1976), who argued that excess supply of college grad-
uates was causing the decline in the college wage premium observed in the USA
during the 1970s. While the cross-sectional properties of overeducation are well-
studied (see, e.g., Alba-Ramirez 1993; Hartog 2000; Kiker et al. 1997; Verdugo and
Verdugo 1989), still little is known about the evolution of overeducation over the life cycle,
although, as argued above, dynamics are of clear interest in this context. US evidence is
particularly scarce.6
A notable exception is Rubb (2003) who provides evidence from the CPS that overed-
ucation displays a substantial degree of persistence, with around 30% of the individuals
overeducated in year t switching to a job which matches their level of education in year
t + 1. While duration dependence and dynamic selection effects imply that these transi-
tion rates are likely to decrease over the length of the spell, the CPS panels are too short
to address this question adequately.
It is worth pointing out that while we borrow the wording “required level of education”
from the existing literature, defining and measuring that concept is not a trivial task. In
this paper, we use a statistical measure, in a similar spirit as, e.g., Verdugo and Verdugo
(1989) and Kiker et al. (1997). Namely, we compute themode of the distribution of school-
ing in the 1989–1991 CPS for each occupation in the 1980 3-digit Census Occupation
classification. We also restrict the CPS sample used to compute the mode to individuals
in the same birth cohorts as the NLSY79 respondents. The required levels of education
are then defined as those within 15 percentage points of the schooling mode.7 The typical
overeducated worker in our sample has 2 or 4 years of college education, but is working as
a secretary or a cashier, say, among a majority of high school graduates. Relative to alter-
native approaches in the literature, and in particular those measuring the required levels
of education with the General Educational Development (GED) scale provided by the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (see, e.g., Hartog 1980; Rumberger 1987), this approach
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is arguably more transparent and has the benefit of directly generating requirements in
terms of years of education.
We document longitudinal patterns of overeducation for the NLSY79 cohort up to 12
years after labor market entry. Overeducation incidence within the cohort decreases as
workers progress through their careers but remains sizeable 12 years after the first job.
This suggests that, while frictions are likely to play a role, we need to appeal to other
economic mechanisms to explain this long-term persistence. Overeducation is also a
fairly persistent phenomenon at the individual level, with around 66% of overeducated
workers remaining in overeducated employment after 1 year. We find that blacks and
low cognitive ability workers (as measured by their AFQT scores) are not only more
likely to be overeducated but also less likely to switch into matched jobs. That is, the
longitudinal dimension magnifies the cross-sectional black-white and cognitive ability
gaps.
The hazard rate out of overeducated work is also strongly decreasing in overeducation
duration and drops by about 60% after 5 years. We estimate a mixed proportional haz-
ard model (Elbers and Ridder 1982) of overeducated employment duration to investigate
whether this decreasing hazard rate reflects selection on unobservables or true dura-
tion dependence. While composition effects based on observable characteristics explain
away some of the duration dependence, further controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
largely wipes it out. In other words, the duration of the overeducated employment spell
does not have a significant impact on the probability to exit overeducation. Instead, we
identify large unobservable differences in the hazard rate: while overeducation is found
to be very persistent for 30% of the sample, the rest is much more likely to exit quickly,
in keeping with a frictional view of overeducation. The latter pattern provides clear evi-
dence that there is generally more to overeducation than selection on unobserved ability
and preferences.
We then revisit the classical augmented wage regression used in the overeducation
literature and document a robust and statistically—as well as economically—significant
negative association between past overeducated employment and wages.8 This pattern
holds after controlling for observed measures of cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
We further show that past overeducation remains associated with lower wages after
adding controls for unobserved ability that are constructed from the heterogeneity types
identified in the duration analysis.
The results from our preferred specification show that, for a non-overeducated worker,
past overeducation is associated with a sizeable wage penalty of between 2.6 and 4.2%,
which persists over 4 years. This provides a likely candidate mechanism behind the
negative wage effects of graduating during a recession (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos et al.
2012; Altonji et al. 2016; Liu et al. 2016), since, consistent with the cyclical upgrad-
ing literature (Bils and McLaughlin 2001), overeducation is likely to be more frequent
during recessions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample
used in the analysis, the construction of the required schooling measure and compares
the cross-sectional properties of our measure of overeducation to the literature. Section 3
documents the longitudinal patterns in the incidence of overeducated employment along
the career. Section 4 estimates a mixed proportional hazard model of overeducated
employment duration allowing us to separate true duration dependence from dynamic
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selection on observed and unobserved worker attributes. Section 5 presents results
pertaining to the effect of past overeducation on wages, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Ourmain data source is the NLSY79 which is a nationally representative sample of 12,686
youngmen and women who were 14–22 years old when they were first surveyed in 1979.9
We pool the observations for the 6111 individuals that comprise the core civilian cross
section of the NLSY79, from the 1982 to the 1994 rounds, which results in 79,443 person-
year observations.10 Then we cut 5947 person-year observations with a level of education
that was unreported or less than 12 years; 22,272 where the individual had not entered
the labor market permanently and 6228 that were non-interviews. We define the date of
(permanent) entry into the labor market as the first survey year where the individual (1)
is employed in the civilian labor force, (2) works more than 26 weeks out of the year, (3) is
not enrolled in school as of May 1 of the survey year, and (4) has reached her highest level
of education over the sample period 1982–1994. After making these cuts, we are left with
a total of 44,996 observations corresponding to 4895 distinct individuals.
The main variables of interest are the highest level of completed education, the occu-
pation (measured using the 1980 3-digit Census code) and the hourly wage at the time of
each interview.11 Besides these, the variables used in our analysis include age, minority
status, gender and place of birth, cognitive and non-cognitive skill measures, geograph-
ical location and the corresponding local unemployment rate, family characteristics, a
measure of hazards associated with the current occupation and employment history
(see Table 1).
2.1 Measuring required schooling
The NLSY79 does not have direct measures of required schooling in the job occupied by
the respondent. In this paper, we use a statistical measure for the required level of edu-
cation, in a similar spirit as, e.g., Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) and Kiker et al. (1997).
Namely, for each given occupation in the 1980 3-digit Census Occupation classification,
we compute the required level of education from the pooled monthly samples of the
1989–1991 waves of the CPS. Those years were chosen with two considerations in mind.
First, they sit in the middle of the date range that we are analyzing. This minimizes the
extent to which technological change might have altered the schooling requirements in
some occupations. Second, the average unemployment rate (5.9% between 1989 and 1991,
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics) was low during these years. This reduces the likeli-
hood that a bad labor market would push so many highly educated individuals into low
schooling requirement occupations that the modal worker in those occupations would
have more schooling than is necessary for their job.12 In order to obtain required school-
ing levels that are pertinent to the NLSY79 sample, we restrict the age range within each
year of the CPS to that of the NLSY79 cohorts at that time (see Appendix for additional
details on the CPS sample used in the analysis). Required schooling in a given occupation
code is then defined as the mode of the distribution of the levels of education among the
individuals working in that occupation.13
3-digit occupational codes correspond to a high level of disaggregation and consti-
tute the finest description of occupations available for a long representative panel of US
workers. Census occupational codes were defined, among other things, according to the
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Table 1 Summary statistics: pooled cross section 1982–1994
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Na
Required education (years) 12.871 (1.751) 34,535
Overeducation (years) 0.391 (1.55) 37,087
Age 27.503 (3.904) 44,996
Black 0.112 (0.315) 44,996
Hispanic 0.058 (0.233) 44,996
Female 0.514 (0.5) 44,996
Born in the USA 0.963 (0.189) 44,996
AFQT 0.503 (0.274) 43,052
Rotter Scale in 1979 8.44 (2.371) 44,669
Sociability in 1985 2.894 (0.669) 43,897
12 years of education 0.661 (0.474) 44,996
14 years of education 0.129 (0.335) 44,996
16 years of education 0.148 (0.355) 44,996
18 years of education 0.063 (0.242) 44,996
GED (no HS diploma) 0.09 (0.286) 44,996
Northeast 0.194 (0.395) 44,748
South 0.331 (0.471) 44,748
West 0.171 (0.377) 44,748
Urban 0.785 (0.411) 43,828
Unemployment rate (in %) 6.814 (1.374) 44,748
HH in SMSA 0.767 (0.423) 42,708
Mother’s edu. (years, 1979) 11.965 (3.387) 41,395
Father’s edu. (years, 1979) 11.714 (2.557) 43,102
Lived with both parents 0.673 (0.469) 44,996
Employed 0.847 (0.36) 44,996
Out of labor force 0.106 (0.307) 44,996
Unemployed 0.048 (0.213) 44,996
Tenure (1000 weeks) 0.17 (0.173) 41,782
Number of jobs 1.407 (0.867) 44,996
Work experience (1000 h) 17.222 (8.800) 29,743
Weeks unemployed 2.291 (7.991) 44,275
Hourly wage 12.717 (6.158) 38,717
Occupational hazards −0.138 (0.952) 37,889
Unemployment rate (by region) corresponds to the annual unemployment rate for each Census region (BLS Local Area
Unemployment Statistics data)
The measure of occupational hazards is drawn from a sample of the 1970 Census which included occupational characteristics
from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). An indicator for a DOT occupation having hazards was averaged within each
1980 Census occupation code; we then convert this percentage measure to a Z-score
Tenure is defined as the total number of weeks an individual has worked in a given occupation across all employers. The total
number of jobs is measured since the last interview
Wages are measured in constant dollars
a Person-year observations
skills involved in performing the job. For example, 3-digit codes distinguish among sales
occupations between jobs that involve increasing degrees of knowledge and task com-
plexity: from street vendors, to cashiers, sales workers (subdivided into eight different
industry groups), sales representatives (six industry groups), sales engineers, and sales
supervisors. However, there still might be unobserved heterogeneity in schooling require-
ments within some 3-digit occupations. One concern would be that a 3-digit occupation
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contains several occupations with different schooling requirements. With this in mind,
for occupations such that the frequencies of two or more schooling levels are within 15
percentage points of each other, we choose to use a more conservative definition of over
(and under)-education. Specifically, workers whose schooling attainments fall within the
range defined by these schooling levels are classified asmatched, while those with a higher
(lower) level of education are defined as overeducated (undereducated). It is important to
note that our results are robust to the choice of other cutoffs.14
In order tomitigate concerns with classification error on attained schooling, we collapse
our years of education variable into four categories: 12–13 years, 14–15, 16–17, and over
18 years of completed education. This classification is natural since each category, simply
referred to as 12, 14, 16, and 18 years of schooling in the rest of the paper, corresponds to
high school graduates, 2-year and 4-year college graduates, and graduate school.15
A clear advantage of this method is that it generates requirements directly in terms of
years of education. This is in contrast to a common approach in the literature which maps
occupations into skills first, and then skills into years of education (using, for example,
the GED scale). In practice the latter approach is problematic, in particular since there is
no clear consensus on the mapping between the skill content of occupations, as measured
by the GED scale, and years of schooling (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011). On the other
hand, one limitation of our measure of required schooling is that it is based on the distri-
bution of schooling attainment among workers employed in a given occupation, which is
an equilibrium outcome of labor supply and demand decisions. This may result in under-
stating the fraction of workers who are overeducated. However, in order for our measure
of required schooling level to be biased upward in any given occupation, the fraction of
overeducated individuals would have to be higher than the fraction of matched individ-
uals, which is possible but likely to be rare. Besides, the use of a conservative definition
of mismatch for those occupations such that the frequencies of two or more schooling
levels are within 15 percentage points of each other implies that only in cases where the
fraction of overeducated individuals is significantly higher than the fraction of matched
individuals would our measure overestimate the actual required schooling level.
2.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the NLSY79 variables used in our analysis. Of the
44,996 observations in our final sample, 84.7% are employed, 10.6% are out of the labor
force, and 4.8% are unemployed, 66.1% are high school graduates, 12.9% have 2 years and
14.8% have 4 years of college education, and 6.3% have some graduate school experience.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of years of overeducation, generated by subtracting an
individual’s observed highest level of completed education from the level of education
required by their occupation. More than half of all observations have a perfect match
of observed and required education, while progressively smaller fractions exhibit 1 or
more years of education level mismatch. Comparing the two panels shows that collapsing
schooling attainment into four categories preserves the shape of the distribution. It also
mitigates the concern that small errors in the measure of years of schooling attainment
will generate overeducation status misclassification.
In Table 2, we further break down overeducation status by our categorical measure
of attained schooling. It is apparent that overeducation is mechanically absent from the
lowest schooling level (12 years of education) while undereducation is absent from the
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Fig. 1 Distribution of overeducation
highest schooling level (18 years of education). Consistent with the existence of a relatively
small number of jobs requiring 14 or 18 years of education, a very large fraction of the
observations corresponding to those schooling levels exhibit education level mismatch.
Although a larger share of jobs require 16 years of education, it is interesting to note
that 37.4% of college graduates are overeducated, typically working in a job requiring 12
years of education. Table 3 lists the 10 occupations accounting for the most number of
observations in overeducated employment. Secretaries and sales workers account for the
largest numbers of overeducated workers. For most of the occupations in the table, the
modal worker has 12 years of schooling, and the typical overeducated worker has 2 or
4 years of college education. One notable exception is teachers, which typically have 16
years of schooling in the CPS.
2.3 Cross-sectional properties of our measure of overeducation
Before moving on to the analysis of the career dynamics of overeducated workers, we
document the properties of our measure of overeducation in the cross section and find
that they are in line with existing studies that use different data set and overeducation
measures. We report in Table 4 the estimation results from a Probit model, which allows
the probability of overeducation to depend on a set of socio-demographic characteristics,
Table 2 Overeducation status proportions by education
Yearly Categories
All 12 14 16 18+
Undereducated 15.8% 14.1% 4.7% 16.3% 2%
Matched 59.5% 68% 95.3% 18% 60.5% 28.7%
Overeducated 24.6% 17.9% 65.7% 37.4% 71.3%
Sample excludes individuals that have completed less than 12 years of education
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Table 3 Ten most frequent occupations among overeducated workers
1980 Census code Occupation Required Edu. Observations
Min. Max. OE Total
313 Secretaries 12 12 420 1525
274 Sales workers, other commodities 12 12 394 960
243 Supervisors and proprietors, sales occupations 12 12 323 772
337 Bookkeepers, accounting, and auditing clerks 12 12 243 649
19 Managers and administrators, n.e.c. 12 16 223 2290
156 Teachers, elementary school 16 16 197 318
389 Administrative support occupations, n.e.c. 12 12 163 415
276 Cashiers 12 12 121 675
433 Supervisors, food preparation and service occupations 12 12 117 254
376 Investigators and adjusters, except insurance 12 12 113 243
The columns for required education correspond to the lowest (Min.) and highest (Max.) levels of education that we calculate from
the CPS. Note that these values will differ if the mode and second largest observed levels of education are separated by fewer
than 15 percentage points
Table 4 Probit model of overeducation status
14 years 16 years 18+ years
Black 0.158*** (0.0555) 0.034 (0.0672) 0.107 (0.1045)
Hispanic 0.121* (0.0629) −0.082 (0.0697) −0.023 (0.0866)
Female 0.054 (0.0392) 0.125*** (0.0290) 0.105*** (0.0374)
Born in the USA 0.207** (0.0838) −0.016 (0.0625) 0.021 (0.0926)
AFQTa −0.132*** (0.0509) −0.148** (0.0622) −0.187* (0.0995)
Rotter Scale in 1979 0.009 (0.0076) 0.006 (0.0065) −0.003 (0.0077)
Sociability in 1985 −0.037 (0.0256) −0.028 (0.0218) 0.018 (0.0285)
GED (no HS diploma) −0.051 (0.0829) −0.282 (0.2361) −0.095 (0.2206)
Northeast −0.027 (0.0522) 0.003 (0.0354) −0.005 (0.0529)
South −0.010 (0.0416) 0.007 (0.0370) −0.008 (0.0452)
West −0.004 (0.0520) 0.006 (0.0426) −0.021 (0.0492)
Unemployment rate 0.015* (0.0093) 0.003 (0.0078) −0.019* (0.0099)
HH in SMSA −0.076 (0.0540) −0.006 (0.0428) 0.032 (0.0504)
Tenure (1000 weeks) 0.075 (0.0976) −0.058 (0.1017) 0.396*** (0.1176)
Work experience (1000 h) −0.005 (0.0062) −0.018*** (0.0056) 0.014* (0.0073)
Work experience2 (1000 h) 0.003 (0.0022) 0.003 (0.0019) −0.006** (0.0028)
Number of jobs 0.031* (0.0161) 0.053*** (0.0140) −0.031* (0.0175)
Total unemp. (weeks.) 0.002*** (0.0006) 0.000 (0.0008) 0.002 (0.0014)
Occupational hazards 0.129*** (0.0328) 0.279*** (0.0415) 0.223** (0.0897)
χ2 201.53 377.76 160.54
LL −1738 −2235.79 −816.98
Observations 3125 4064 1763
Model also includes controls for industry, age, mother and father’s education level in 1979, a dummy for living with both parents
in 1979, and a dummy for living in an urban area at the time of interview
Unemployment rate (by region) corresponds to the annual unemployment rate for each Census region (BLS Local Area
Unemployment Statistics data)
Entries correspond to marginal effects (standard errors in parentheses)
aValues converted to Z-scores
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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ability measures, family characteristics, a measure of hazards associated with the current
occupation and employment history.16 We stratify the regression by schooling level, con-
sistent with our focus throughout the paper on overeducation as a labor market, rather
than educational, phenomenon.
AFQT scores exhibit a negative and significant relationship with overeducation at all
schooling attainments. This negative relationship between cognitive ability and the like-
lihood of overeducation, which is in line with prior findings in the literature (see, e.g.,
Allen and Van der Velden 2001; Chevalier and Lindley 2009), supports the idea that, con-
ditional on working in any given occupation, individuals with relatively low ability tend to
have acquired more skills through schooling than their higher ability peers.
Also in accordance with existing studies, females are about 5 to 13 percentage points
more likely to be overeducated than males. Women may place more value on non-
pecuniary characteristics associated with low-requirement jobs, such as flexibility in
hours worked or their proximity to the family house, making it easier to combine work
and home production activities. Alternatively, this could reflect discrimination on the part
of employers. At any rate, given the existence of a substantial and persistent wage penalty
of being overeducated (discussed in Section 5), this result implies that overeducation is
an important aspect of the gender wage gap, which is absent from most of the literature
on this question.17
Noteworthy, there is also a strong positive correlation between minority status and
overeducation at the 14 years of schooling level. Blacks and Hispanics are 15.8 percentage
points and 12.1 percentage points, respectively, likelier than whites to be overeducated
among that group. Among college graduates and above, the relationship becomes insignif-
icant, which is possibly a result of a strong selection into college based on unobservable
skills that are negatively correlated with overeducation.
Lastly, the evidence regarding the theory that overeducated workers accept lower wages
in exchange for better non-pecuniary job characteristics is mixed. Workers in hazardous
jobs are actually more likely to be overeducated at all three levels of schooling. On the
other hand, overeducated workers are more likely to hold several jobs (except for those
with 18 or more years of schooling), which possibly reflects a higher flexibility for these
overeducated jobs. These results complement previous studies that have interpreted a
negative correlation between overeducation and job satisfaction as evidence against the
compensating wage differential model of overeducation (see, e.g., Hersch 1991; Korpi and
Tåhlin 2009).
3 Longitudinal patterns in overeducation
In this section we document patterns in overeducation in the longitudinal dimension,
including (i) the aggregate incidence of overeducated employment over the career, (ii)
individual transitions into and out of overeducation, and (iii) the hazard rates out of
overeducation.
Figure 2 displays the fraction of our sample that is overeducated over the first 12 years
of work for the NLSY79 cohort, for workers with at least some college. Overall, the inci-
dence of overeducation decreases by about 12 percentage points, from 62.3 to 50.4%, over
the first 12 years of respondents’ careers.18 While the decline in aggregate overeducation
rates as the career progresses does suggest that overeducation is in part frictional, the
most striking feature of this graph is that the incidence of overeducation remains very
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Fig. 2 Composition of overeducation (fraction of respondents)
high more than 10 years after labor market entry. Overall, this is a clear indication that
overeducation is a persistent phenomenon.
In Fig. 3, we further disaggregate this graph along several observable characteristics.
Blacks do not exhibit the same reduction in overeducation as whites (panels 1 and 2).
Similarly, panels 3 and 4 show that overeducation among females decreases much less
than among males.
Lastly, individuals at higher AFQT quartiles see a larger decline in overeducation
incidence than those at lower quartiles (panels 5 through 8).
Overall, these results suggest that overeducated black, female, and low-AFQT workers
are less likely to receive and/or accept offers from matched jobs. These dynamic patterns
therefore accentuate their already higher propensity to be overeducated.
Individual patterns point to a similar story. Table 5 presents the fractions of individuals
who are non-employed (defined as unemployed or out of the labor force), undereducated,
overeducated, or matched at interview time, conditional on the status reported during
the interview 1 year before, for workers with at least some postsecondary education.
Overeducation is also persistent at the individual level, with 66.0% of workers remaining
overeducated after 1 year. This fraction is 20 points higher than the unconditional overe-
ducation rate (46.3%). By comparison, non-employed individuals have a smaller 49.0%
chance of remaining in that state.19
Transition rates are further broken down by gender and race in Tables 6 and 7. Men are
slightly more likely than women to remain in an overeducated job but also more likely to
transition into matched jobs. Differences by race are sizeable: (i) overeducation is more
persistent among blacks relative to whites, (ii) overeducated blacks are much less likely
than whites to transition to amatched job, and (iii) these matched spells are less persistent
for blacks than for whites. Finally, as illustrated in Table 8, the persistence of overed-
ucation decreases monotonically with AFQT scores. All of these patterns in individual
transitions confirm that the aggregate persistence described earlier does not result from
cancelling flows in and out of overeducation.
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Fig. 3 Composition of overeducation (14 years of education or more)
Table 5 Transition matrix
t
t − 1 OE UE Matched Non-emp.
Overeducated 66.0% 4.2% 25.1% 4.7%
Undereducated 29.0% 44.9% 20.8% 5.4%
Matched 28.4% 3.9% 64.2% 3.6%
Non-employed 30.8% 4.7% 15.5% 49.0%
Total 46.3% 7.5% 37.6% 8.6%
Note: Sample has entered the labor market and has a schooling attainment of 14 years or more
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Table 6 Transition matrix by gender
t
t − 1 OE UE Matched Non-emp.
Male
Overeducated 66.4% 3.7% 26.5% 3.4%
Undereducated 28.9% 49.0% 18.8% 3.4%
Matched 29.3% 3.1% 65.4% 2.2%
Non-employed 49.2% 7.0% 18.8% 25.0%
Total 48.6% 6.7% 40.5% 4.2%
Female
Overeducated 65.5% 4.7% 23.8% 6.0%
Undereducated 29.0% 42.3% 22.0% 6.6%
Matched 27.3% 4.7% 63.0% 5.0%
Non-employed 23.5% 3.7% 14.2% 58.5%
Total 44.1% 8.2% 35.0% 12.6%
Note: Sample has entered the labor market and has a schooling attainment of 14 years or more
Table 5 also shows that transitions into overeducation are equally likely among work-
ers who were undereducated, matched, or non-employed in the previous year.20 Among
males, however, non-employed workers are much likelier to transition into overeducation
than matched or undereducated workers (Table 6). Across all categories of workers, but
especially for black and low-AFQT workers, the non-employed are more likely to transi-
tion into overeducation than into matched jobs (Tables 7 and 8). In addition, transitions
into matched jobs are more common among the overeducated than the non-employed.
Taken together, these patterns suggest that for some workers overeducation is a pathway
from non-employment into matched employment.
Finally, the NLSY79 data allows us to go beyond annual transitions, and report the
hazard rates out of overeducated employment as a function of the duration of overeduca-
tion (see Fig. 4).21 After 3 years being overeducated, the probability of exiting that state,
defined as starting a new matched or undereducated employment spell, drops from 39
Table 7 Transition matrix by race
t
t − 1 OE UE Matched Non-emp.
White
Overeducated 65.5% 3.9% 26.0% 4.6%
Undereducated 27.4% 44.4% 22.6% 5.6%
Matched 27.8% 3.7% 64.9% 3.6%
Non-employed 29.4% 4.6% 16.8% 49.2%
Total 45.4% 7.1% 39.0% 8.4%
Black
Overeducated 70.1% 6.8% 17.2% 5.9%
Undereducated 40.0% 48.0% 8.0% 4.0%
Matched 35.8% 6.4% 54.1% 3.7%
Non-employed 40.4% 5.3% 7.0% 47.4%
Total 54.2% 11.2% 24.0% 10.5%
Note: Sample has entered the labor market and has a schooling attainment of 14 years or more
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Table 8 Transition matrix by AFQT quartile
t
t − 1 OE UE Matched Non-emp.
Lowest
Overeducated 72.8% 6.2% 15.4% 5.6%
Undereducated 42.1% 42.1% 5.3% 10.5%
Matched 37.1% 9.7% 50.0% 3.2%
Non-employed 44.7% 2.6% 0.0% 52.6%
Total 58.0% 11.0% 19.3% 11.7%
2nd
Overeducated 71.5% 6.3% 16.9% 5.3%
Undereducated 46.0% 34.9% 12.7% 6.3%
Matched 31.7% 1.8% 58.7% 7.8%
Non-employed 30.8% 0.0% 15.4% 53.8%
Total 52.9% 6.7% 28.5% 12.0%
3rd
Overeducated 66.3% 4.1% 24.7% 5.0%
Undereducated 26.7% 45.9% 20.7% 6.7%
Matched 30.5% 4.4% 61.4% 3.6%
Non-employed 32.4% 9.4% 17.3% 41.0%
Total 46.9% 8.7% 36.3% 8.2%
Highest
Overeducated 62.5% 2.9% 30.5% 4.1%
Undereducated 21.8% 46.5% 28.9% 2.8%
Matched 25.4% 3.9% 68.2% 2.5%
Non-employed 23.8% 4.2% 19.0% 53.0%
Total 41.7% 6.4% 44.6% 7.3%
Note: Sample has entered the labor market and has a schooling attainment of 14 years or more
to only 20%. This number further drops to 15 and 10% after 5 and 10 years, respectively.
Overall, while this pattern is consistent with a negative duration dependence associated
with overeducated employment, it could also result from compositional effects (perma-
nent heterogeneity correlated with the hazard rate out of overeducated employment). We
attempt to tell these two effects apart in the next section.
4 Duration dependence versus dynamic selection
The results discussed so far provide some suggestive evidence of duration dependence
in overeducation status, with a strongly decreasing hazard rate out of overeducation.
However, in order to establish the role played by true, rather than spurious, duration
dependence, we need to control for dynamic selection on worker attributes.
Specifically, we assume that the duration of the first spell of overeducated employ-
ment is determined by a mixed proportional hazard model, where the baseline duration
follows a Weibull distribution. For this exercise we adopt the following definition of
“overeducation spell”. We consider that an overeducated individual has exited their first
overeducation spell when they become employed in an occupation that matches their
schooling level, or when they become under-educated.22 By definition, this model is
estimated on the (1648) individuals who have at least one overeducated spell, which
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Fig. 4 Hazard out of overeducation
mechanically excludes individuals with only 12 years of schooling.23 While using a para-
metric specification allows us to get more precise estimates, it is important to note that
the mixed proportional hazard model is nonparametrically identified from single-spell
data only (Elbers and Ridder 1982). The probability distribution function (pdf.) and cumu-
lative distribution function (cdf.) of the duration of the overeducation spell, conditional
on the set of observed individual characteristics xi and the unobserved heterogeneity νi,
are respectively given by:
f (t|xi, νi,α, θ) = exp (xiθ) αtα−1νi exp
[− exp (xiθ) tανi
]
, (1)
F (t|xi, νi,α, θ) = 1 − exp
[− exp (xiθ) tανi
]
. (2)
Following Heckman and Singer (1984), we assume that the unobserved heterogene-
ity follows a discrete distribution with R points of support. The parameters (α, θ)
and the unobserved heterogeneity distribution are then estimated by maximizing the





di log f (ti|xi,α, θ) + (1 − di) log [1 − F (Ti|xi,α, θ)]
]
where N is the number of individuals in the sample with at least one overeducated spell,
di = 1 if individual i leaves the overeducated state before the end of the survey (0 oth-
erwise), ti is the duration of the first overeducation spell (observed if di = 1) and Ti is
the length of time to the end of the survey. The pdf. of the overeducation spell dura-
tion is given by f (t|xi,α, θ) = Eν
(
f (t|xi, νi,α, θ)
)
and the cdf. is given by F (t|xi,α, θ) =
Eν (F (t|xi, νi,α, θ)), where Eν(.) denotes the expectation operator with respect to the dis-
tribution of ν. Throughout our analysis, we consider that an overeducation spell ends
when the individual starts a new employment spell in an occupation which does not
require less than his level of schooling.24 It is interesting to compare the estimates for
R = 1 (i.e., without unobserved heterogeneity) and R = 2 (i.e., with two unobserved
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heterogeneity types).25 Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 9 report the estimation results corre-
sponding to the case without unobserved heterogeneity with alternative sets of individual
controls. The estimated α is well below one (between 0.77 and 0.84 depending on the
specification), which means that the hazard out of overeducation is strongly decreasing in
the duration of overeducation even after controlling for observed heterogeneity. In other
words, while part of this negative duration dependence is attributable to selection on
observables, as shown by the increase in the estimated α parameter going from specifica-
tion (3) to (1), the exit rate is still declining with the duration of the overeducation spell
after controlling for an extensive set of observed characteristics.
By contrast, once we allow for unobserved heterogeneity, we obtain values for α that are
very close to one, signifying the absence of true duration dependence (Table 9, columns
1, 3, and 5). In other words, the duration of the first overeducated employment spell does
not seem to have a significant impact on the probability to exit overeducation. The esti-
mation results point to the existence of two groups of individuals with markedly different
dynamics. Those two groups are identified from the variation in the duration of the first
overeducation spell, conditional on observed characteristics. The first group has a low
hazard (type 1, 29.1% of the ever-overeducated in the sample) while the second group is
much more likely to exit overeducation quickly (type 2, 70.9%). As type 2 s exit the pool
of overeducated individuals, the probability that a random individual exits overeducation
declines, as she is more and more likely to be a low-hazard, type 1 individual.
The ratio between the two unobserved heterogeneity parameters is V1V2 = 0.11, which
implies that type 2 s exit overeducation almost 10 times as fast as type 1 s. Interestingly,
the stark difference in hazard rates between the two unobserved groups suggests that
overeducation follows different mechanisms in each case. The high exit rate in group 2 is
consistent with a frictional view of overeducation. For the remaining, low-hazard third of
the sample, it could be that their aptitude (after controlling for AFQT) is not sufficient for
jobs that match their level of formal schooling. Alternatively, they may have preferences
for non-pecuniary, unobserved job characteristics found in some of the jobs that require
less schooling, thus translating into highly persistent overeducation. In the next section,
we explore these ideas further as we examine whether the two types differ in the wage
patterns they exhibit.
The coefficients on observable characteristics allow us to complement and refine the
analysis of the raw transition dynamics presented in Section 3. The negative coefficient
on blacks in all specifications of the duration model implies that the lower exit rates out
of overeducation for that group are robust to controlling for observable and unobserv-
able heterogeneity. Similarly, the positive effect of AFQT scores on overeducation exit
also carries over from the raw transitions into the mixed proportional hazard model.
The coefficient for women is also significantly negative when the full set of observable
characteristics is included in the proportional hazard model. However, once unobserved
heterogeneity is taken into account, being female no longer has a statistically significant
relationship with the probability of exiting overeducation. This runs against the notion
that discrimination would keep women in jobs where they are overeducated.
Lastly, an interesting finding is that time spent unemployed in the past is associated
with lower propensities to exit overeducation. This result complements a previous finding
in the literature that longer time spent unemployed reduces the probability of finding a
job (see, e.g., Kroft et al. 2013). It also suggests that higher overeducation persistence is
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one of the mechanisms through which past unemployment affects future wages (see, e.g.,
Schmieder et al. 2016).
5 Dynamic effects of overeducation on wages
While the regressions found in the literature focus on the cross-sectional correlation
between current overeducation and wages, we examine whether initial overeducation is
also associated with lower wages later in the career. Figure 5 describes the median hourly
wage among workers with 14, 16, and 18 years of education as they progress through their
career, conditional on their overeducation status. The striking result here is that the neg-
ative association between wages and overeducation at the start of the career appears very
persistent over time for the first two schooling categories (14 and 16 years). In the follow-
ing sections, we provide additional evidence of these effects by showing that the negative
association between past overeducated employment and wages still holds after control-
ling for observed heterogeneity (including AFQT scores and measures of non-cognitive
skills), and for the unobserved heterogeneity types identified in the duration analysis.
5.1 Augmented wage regressions
The impact of overeducation on wages has been measured in the literature by applying
OLS to the following log-wage equation introduced by Duncan and Hoffman (1981):
logwit = αrSrit + αoSoit + αuSuit + X′itβ + εit
where, for any given individual i in year t, Srit , Soit and Suit denote respectively the num-
ber of years of required schooling, years of overeducation (years of schooling above the
required level), and years of undereducation (years of schooling below the required level),
Xit a vector of controls (including ability measures, socio-demographic background char-
acteristics, labor market experience, and experience squared) and εit an idiosyncratic
Fig. 5 Path of median hourly wage
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productivity shock. This model, which nests the standard Mincerian wage regression
(αr = αo = −αu), allows for the estimation of separate wage returns to the (i) required
years of schooling, (ii) years of overeducation, and (iii) years of undereducation.
Table 10, panel 1, presents the pooled OLS parameter estimates for this model using
our data.26
Unlike for the rest of our analysis, individuals with 12 years of schooling are part
of the estimation sample. Recall also that we restrict the sample to those individuals
who have entered the labor market at some point between 1982 and 1994.27 While
none of these individuals are overeducated, including them helps identify the returns
to the required years of schooling, years of overeducation, and years of undereduca-
tion. The results from our sample are broadly consistent with prior existing studies.
Namely, we see a return of 9.5% for each additional year of education, less than half the
rate of return (3.5%) for additional years of education over the required level, and sub-
stantial wage penalties for years of undereducation (−6.5% for each additional year of
undereducation).
These estimates also reveal a number of expected results. In particular, we see a gender
wage gap of 15.3%, and a significant compensating wage differential for hazardous occu-
pations. We also find significant wage premia relative to the North Central region of 9.6
and 6.9% for Northeast andWest, respectively, consistent with higher average costs of liv-
ing in these regions. Lastly, measures for labor market experience all have the expected
sign. Those with greater occupation-specific tenure, and total labor market experience
have higher wages. Conversely, those with frequent and/or long unemployment spells (as
measured by total unemployment experience in weeks), and those frequently switching
jobs during the year have lower wage rates, all else equal.
Following up on the dynamic patterns discussed at the beginning of the section, we
report in panel 2 of Table 10 the estimation results from a log-wage regression which is
further augmented with four lags in overeducation status. We also include interactions
between lagged overeducation status and an indicator for the fact that the overeducation
spell is ongoing. This disentangles the effect of past completed overeducation spells on
wages when an individual is currently matched or undereducated, from the effect of the
duration of an ongoing overeducated spell on current wages if an individual is still overe-
ducated. Notably, we find wage penalties of 2.1–4.2% per year associated with up to four
lags of overeducation. Those estimates, which show that having been overeducated in the
past is associated with lower wages in current jobs irrespective of whether one is overed-
ucated or not in them, are both statistically and economically significant for the first three
lags.28 It is interesting to compare the magnitude of these “scarring” effects with those
generated by past unemployment. While the drop in wage associated with the first lag of
unemployment is found to be sizeably stronger than that associated with overeducation
(7.7 vs. 4.2%), the penalty associated with past unemployment is also less persistent as
further lags do not significantly affect wages.
These results show that the negative association between overeducation and future
wages suggested by the raw wage data remains after including a rich set of controls,
including measures of cognitive and non-cognitive ability. To the extent that, consistent
with the cyclical upgrading literature (see, e.g., Bils and McLaughlin 2001), overeducated
employment is likely to be more frequent during recessions, it follows that overeducation
is a candidate mechanism behind the negative and persistent wage effects of graduating
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Table 10 Augmented log-wage regressions
(1) (2)
ln (HourlyWage) ln (HourlyWage)
Required education (years) 0.095*** (0.0045) 0.107*** (0.0051)
Schooling above required (years) 0.035*** (0.0055) 0.061*** (0.0065)
Schooling below required (years) −0.065*** (0.0070) -0.076*** (0.0074)
Black 0.008 (0.0252) 0.004 (0.0255)
Hispanic 0.043 (0.0339) 0.047 (0.0338)
Female −0.153*** (0.0148) −0.146*** (0.0147)
Born in the USA −0.049 (0.0389) −0.050 (0.0388)
AFQTa 0.110*** (0.0126) 0.112*** (0.0128)
Rotter Scale in 1979 −0.004 (0.0029) −0.004 (0.0029)
Sociability in 1985 0.006 (0.0104) 0.005 (0.0104)
GED (no HS diploma) 0.001 (0.0256) −0.010 (0.0254)
Northeast 0.096*** (0.0191) 0.100*** (0.0189)
South −0.027 (0.0167) −0.022 (0.0167)
West 0.069*** (0.0213) 0.076*** (0.0213)
Unemployment rate 0.001 (0.0032) −0.000 (0.0032)
HH in SMSA 0.129*** (0.0186) 0.130*** (0.0187)
Tenure (1000 weeks) 0.249*** (0.0355) 0.262*** (0.0352)
Work experience (1000 h) 0.035*** (0.0030) 0.036*** (0.0030)
Work experience2 (1000 h) −0.008*** (0.0010) −0.008*** (0.0010)
Number of jobs −0.059*** (0.0069) −0.058*** (0.0069)
Total unemp. (weeks) −0.001*** (0.0002)
Occupational hazards 0.045*** (0.0066) 0.044*** (0.0066)
Constant 1.063*** (0.1024) 0.989*** (0.1060)
Unemployed (t − 1) −0.077*** (0.0239)
Unemployed (t − 2) −0.029 (0.0183)
Unemployed (t − 3) −0.002 (0.0158)
Unemployed (t − 4) −0.038* (0.0219)
Overeducated (t − 1) −0.042*** (0.0130)
Overeducated (t − 2) −0.038*** (0.0105)
Overeducated (t − 3) −0.035*** (0.0113)
Overeducated (t − 4) −0.021* (0.0127)
Overeducated (t − 1), spell ongoing 0.016 (0.0187)
Overeducated (t − 2), spell ongoing 0.016 (0.0287)
Overeducated (t − 3), spell ongoing 0.017 (0.0385)
Overeducated (t − 4), spell ongoing −0.009 (0.0584)
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.375
F 113.4 80.4
Observations 12,775 12,775
Model also includes controls for age, mother and father’s education level in 1979, a dummy for living with both parents in 1979,
and a dummy for living in an urban area at the time of interview
Model estimated on individuals with 12 years of schooling or higher, at least four years after labor market entry
Unemployment rate (by region) corresponds to the annual unemployment rate for each Census region (BLS Local Area
Unemployment Statistics data)
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level
aValues converted to Z-scores
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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during a recession recently uncovered in the literature (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos et al. 2012;
Altonji et al. 2016; Liu et al. 2016).
5.2 Controlling for heterogeneity in unobserved ability
The estimation results discussed in the previous section show that overeducated employ-
ment spells are associated with lower current and future wages, even after controlling for
cognitive and non-cognitive ability measures. However, one should exercise caution in
interpreting these estimates in a causal fashion, as theymay still suffer for an omitted vari-
able bias. In this section we exploit the estimates from the duration model in Section 4 to
control for residual differences in unobserved ability.29
To the extent that low-ability individuals tend to remain overeducated longer, for
instance through lower arrival rates of non-overeducated employment offers, we can
expect the unobserved heterogeneity types from the duration model to be correlated with
the residual unobserved ability components that could cause an omitted variable bias in
the augmented wage regression.30
In the following, we use this idea to correct for some of the potential residual unob-
served ability bias in our augmented wage regression.
Specifically, we add a type-specific intercept and estimate the model by weighted least
squares, using as weights the posterior type probabilities obtained from the mixed pro-
portional hazard model. For each individual i in the sample, we compute the posterior
probabilities of being of each type using Bayes’ rule. Namely, the predicted posterior
probability of being of type r ∈ {1, 2} is given by:
π̂ir = f
(







where f (ti|xi, ν = νr , α̂, θ̂ ) and f (ti|xi, α̂, θ̂ ) denote the density of the duration of the
first overeducation spell ti evaluated at the estimated parameters (̂α, θ̂ ), conditionally and
unconditionally on being of type r. π̂r is the estimated (unconditional) probability of being
of type r. The heterogeneity types are primarily identified from instances in which the
duration of the first overeducation spell goes in the opposite direction of what would be
predicted using observable characteristics only. For example, high-AFQT individuals who
remain overeducated for a long period of time will tend to have a high probability of being
of type 1 (“low-hazard” type). Conversely, low-AFQT individuals who exit overeducation
quickly will be more likely to be of type 2 (“high-hazard” type).
Estimation results are reported in Table 11.31 The first two panels correspond to the
model without lagged overeducation regressors, while panels 3 and 4 incorporate four
lags in overeducation status. In both cases we contrast our weighted least squares model
(panels 1 and 3) with simple OLS (panels 2 and 4).
In order to exploit the mixed proportional hazard model results, this model is esti-
mated on the subsample of individuals with at least one reported overeducation spell.
Observe first, that for all four specifications, the returns to required schooling and years
of overeducation and the penalties to years of undereducation are lower than in the wage
regressions of Table 10. This finding is consistent with overeducation being negatively
correlated with ability. However, having been overeducated in the past still carries a wage
penalty that is comparable to the one identified in the full sample. As shown in Table 11
(panel 3), these penalties for having been overeducated in the past remain significant,
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sizeable, and quantitatively similar to the estimates obtained without the inclusion of the
type-specific intercept (panel 4) as well as those obtained using the full sample in Table 10.
Although one cannot rule out the possibility that some alternative unobserved individ-
ual attributes might partly confound these estimates, the robustness of the results to the
inclusion of the heterogeneity type-specific dummies does provide reassurance that the
estimated earning penalties associated with past overeducation spells are not driven by
selection on unobserved ability. As such, our results support the existence of scarring
effects from past overeducation, reminiscent of what has been identified in the case of
long-term unemployment (Arulampalam et al. 2001).32
6 Conclusions
Although economists and policymakers have long been concerned about the determi-
nants and wage effects of overeducation, little is still known about its dynamics along
the career. This paper combines data from the NLSY79 and CPS to provide the first
analysis of the career dynamics of overeducated US workers. Overall, we find overed-
ucation to be a persistent phenomenon, particularly for blacks and low-ability workers,
associated with persistently and sizeably lower wages. The latter finding bears similarity
with the scarring effects that have been found to accompany prolonged unemployment
spells.
Controlling for dynamic selection on unobservable characteristics is key in this context.
While the exit rate from overeducation decreases quickly over the duration of an overe-
ducation spell, the estimation of a mixed proportional hazard model suggests that, after
controlling for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity, true duration dependence
is not strong. Rather, the propensity to exit overeducated employment appears to be very
heterogeneous among workers.
We find that past unemployment is associated with a higher duration of future overe-
ducation spells, thus indicating that overeducation is likely to be one of the mechanisms
through which the scarring effects on earnings associated with unemployment spells
operate. The scarring effects associated with overeducation could also account for some
of the negative wage effects of graduating during a recession which have been recently
uncovered in the literature.
From a policy standpoint, since both overeducation and unemployment (see, e.g.,
Saporta-Eksten 2014) are associated with negative and persistent wage shocks, a relevant
question becomes whether a marginal increase in unemployment duration is more or less
harmful, in terms of lifetime earnings, than entering an overeducation spell. The answer
has bearing on the design of unemployment insurance—should early exit be encouraged
at the cost of more mismatch?—and the appropriate evaluation of the performance of
employment agencies.
In sum, our results show that overeducation is a complex phenomenon that involves
a number of the classical ingredients of labor economics: human capital, search fric-
tions, ability differences, and perhaps, compensating wage differentials. In order to
quantify the importance of each mechanism and explore the effects of unemployment
insurance or schooling subsidy programs, a promising avenue would be to estimate a
dynamic model of schooling and occupational choice that would nest these different
channels, while allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity in job mobility and
productivity.
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Endnotes
1 The overeducation incidence and returns to overschooling numbers cited in this para-
graph are obtained by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) by averaging estimates from 151
studies.
2 The career mobility factor was initially investigated by Sicherman and Galor (1990).
The general idea is that high-skilled workers may face higher promotion probabilities
in low-skilled jobs. It follows that forward-looking individuals may choose to become
overeducated.
3 Throughout the paper, we use “matched” as a shorthand for being neither overe-
ducated nor undereducated for one’s job. While we choose to focus our analysis on
overeducation, it is worth noting that undereducation is also relatively common, in par-
ticular among individuals who have completed 14 years of education, and, as such, has
the potential to account for some of the wage dispersion within this schooling category.
4 In practice we restrict our analysis to individuals who have completed their highest
level of education over the sample period (1982–1994), so that all changes in overeduca-
tion status result from a change in employment rather than from a change in schooling
attainment. See, e.g., Pavan (2011), Flabbi and Moro (2012) and Joubert (2015) who
estimate dynamic models of occupational choice with search frictions.
5 See Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) who show that, in a model with two sectors, two
skills (college and non-college) and heterogeneous preferences for each sector, some col-
lege workers may choose to work in the non-college sector. Uncertainty in returns to
schooling is another channel which could generate persistence in overeducation, since
some individuals may find it ex post optimal to be overeducated (see Lee et al. 2015).
6 Several studies have used German, British, Canadian or Australian data to estimate
panel wage regressions (Bauer 2002; Frenette 2004), dynamic random effect models of
overeducation exit (Mavromaras et al. 2013) or simply document overeducation status
transitions (Dolton and Vignoles 2000). Pollmann-Schult and Büchel (2004) estimate
a hazard model to investigate the effect of different covariates on overeducation dura-
tion for German vocational school graduates, but do not attempt to evaluate duration
dependence itself.
7Using this type of conservative measure of mismatch allows us to mitigate the risk of
misclassification, which could arise if two or more occupations with different required
levels of education were aggregated up at the 3-digit level. Depending on the aggregation
level used for the educational attainment, our measure of overeducation yields incidence
levels of between 18% and 25% among all workers, and as much as about 40% among
college graduates.
8Augmented wage regressions, pioneered by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) replace the
usual years-of-education regressor with three terms: years of required education in the
current occupation, years of education in excess of that required level and years of educa-
tion below that required level. The corresponding coefficients are interpreted as returns
to required education, returns to overeducation and returns to undereducation. In a sim-
ilar spirit, a number of recent papers stress the importance of relaxing the homogeneous
and linear returns to schooling assumption in the classical Mincer regression (see, e.g.,
Belzil and Hansen 2002; Heckman et al. 2006).
9Of the 12,686 individuals interviewed in the initial 1979 wave, these data provide
information for respondents on a yearly basis from 1979 to 1994 and biyearly afterwards.
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The initial wave is comprised of a core civilian cross-section of 6,111 and an oversam-
ple of 5,295 black, Hispanic, and economically disadvantaged individuals born between
January 1, 1957 and Dec. 31 1964. This is further supplemented by a military sample of
1,280 individuals born in the same period. We only keep the core cross-sectional sam-
ple of the NLSY79 in order to maintain a consistent sample between the NLSY79 and
the CPS.
10We restrict our sample to these years because it is the largest contiguous period where
the NLSY79 reports the 1980 Census Occupation codes on an annual basis. We use the
1980 codes because they better reflect the set of occupations available over the period of
interest than the 1970 codes.
11 In practice, we use the occupation and hourly wage corresponding to the current or
most recent job at the time of the interview. When individuals hold multiple jobs at the
same time, we use the occupation and wage corresponding to the job in which the respon-
dent worked the most hours. We adjust for inflation by reporting all wages in constant
dollars and then drop the top and bottom 2.5% of the reported person-year wages for
every survey wave.
12We investigated the sensitivity of the distribution of required schooling levels to the
CPS waves used to construct the requirements. Specifically, we reconstructed the school-
ing requirements associated with each occupation using the pooled monthly samples of
the 1983–1985 waves of the CPS. Less than 1% of the observations used in our analysis
correspond to an occupation where the required schooling would differ when using this
alternative measure.
13 Finite sample variability should not be a major concern here given the large number
of observations (on average above 1,000) which are used to estimate the mode of each
occupation. See, e.g., Dutta and Goswami (2010), who show that, for a Bernoulli distri-
bution with sample size larger than 100, the mode of the empirical distribution matches
the population mode with a probability close to 0.9.
14 Specifically, we considered four alternative definitions of over (and under)-education,
using (i) the mode only (i.e. no cutoff ), (ii) a 5% cutoff, (iii) a 10% cutoff and (iv) a 20% cut-
off. Results from these alternative specifications are qualitatively similar to those obtained
using our baseline definition.
15 It is also possible that errors in the occupation codes recorded in each interview of the
NLSY79 could generate artificial transitions between overeducation statuses. In that case,
our estimates of overeducation persistence could still be interpreted as lower bounds.
16 In practice we use a partial maximum likelihood estimator, clustering standard errors
at the individual level. The resulting inference is robust to serial correlation in the
unobserved determinants of overeducation.
17One notable exception is the early analysis by Frank (1978).
18Using a self-reported measure of overeducation, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) also find
that its incidence among a 1980 cohort of U.K. university graduates decreased over time,
from 38 to 30% 6 years after graduating.
19With a different measure of overeducation and using CPS data, Rubb (2003) obtains
a level of persistence for overeducated individuals of 73%.
20Note that some of the transitions into overeducation from undereducated ormatched
employment are likely to mask non-employment spells occurring between two consecu-
tive interviews.
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21 For any given year t, these hazard rates are computed as the number of individuals
leaving overeducated employment in year t, divided by the number of individuals who are
still overeducated at the beginning of year t.
22 In other words, they may have been overeducated in several different jobs or
unemployed at different points of that first overeducation spell.
23 Restricting the analysis to the subsample of individuals who have been overeducated
at least once within the first three years of labor market entry does not significantly affect
our results (results available from the authors upon request).
24 The NLSY79 allows us to compute the required level of education only for the current
or most recent job at the time of each interview (the “CPS job”). To keep the exposi-
tion simple, the duration model we present in the text ignores the existence of job spells
that might have occurred in between two interviews. We also estimated a model that
explicitly takes into account these between-interview employment spells, treating the
corresponding overeducation status as missing, which resulted in negligible differences
in the estimation results (available upon request).
25We estimated the model with more than two types, but including these additional
types did not significantly improve the fit of the model. It resulted in higher BIC criteria
than the model with two types while attributing similar values for the key parameters.
26 For the occupations such that the discrepancy between the frequency of the mode
and the second most frequent schooling level is less than 15 percentage points, indi-
viduals whose schooling level falls with the range defined by the two most frequent
schooling levels are assumed to be matched, and years of required schooling is set equal
to their actual level of education. Individuals whose schooling level is higher (lower) than
the upper (lower) bound of the aforementioned range are assumed to be overeducated
(undereducated), and years of required schooling is set equal to that upper (lower) bound.
27Only 3.1% of the individuals are excluded from our analysis from this selection
step, suggesting that selection into employment is unlikely to be of first-order empirical
importance.
28Older lags, on the other hand, do not generate significant additional penalties (results
available from the authors upon request).
29Alternative approaches to correcting for the correlation between unobserved ability
and overeducation status present serious challenges in this context. The instrumental
variables approach requires a valid instrument for required schooling in addition to the
usual instrument for schooling. In the fixed effect approach, the returns to schooling are
identified off of individuals changing jobs with different required schooling levels, and,
in particular, switching across matched, undereducated and overeducated jobs. These
transitions are likely to be correlated with changes in unobserved wage determinants.
Besides, the fixed effect estimates may not be generalizable to those who never switch
overeducation status.
30Note that, consistent with low-ability individuals being less likely to leave overeduca-
tion, AFQT has a positive and significant effect on the hazard rate out of overeducation
(see Section 4).
31 In this model, duration of the first overeducation spell effectively plays the role of an
exclusion restriction, which affects wages only indirectly through the heterogeneity types.
32We re-estimated the duration model and wage regressions after excluding workers
with 18 years of schooling or more from the sample (results available from the authors
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upon request). The results of the duration model are quantitatively very similar. In
the augmented wage regressions, penalties for current and past overeducation are still
present and even larger, with overeducated workers receiving negligibly small returns
from their years of schooling beyond the required schooling level.
Appendix
CPS data
The 1989–1991 monthly CPS survey has a sample target of 50,000 households split into
eight representative subsamples, each of which is interviewed for the first and last four
months of a 16-month period. In any given month, a new sample of 6250 households is
surveyed for the first time. As a result, the pooled monthly CPS data from January of 1989
through December of 1991 contain 268,750 unique households.
From these pooled cross-sections we keep only observations in the age range spanned
by the NLSY79 cohort, which leaves 795,631 observations. Then we drop observations
where an individual is unemployed, does not report a Census occupation code, has amiss-
ing level of education, did not complete the reported level of education, or is enrolled in
college.
After making these cuts, we are left with a sample of 506,930 occupation and educa-
tion level pairs, where the education level is defined as the highest grade achieved by the
surveyed individual.
From this sample we estimate the required level of education for each occupation iden-
tified by its 3-digit Census occupation code. The required level of education is defined
as the sample mode of the distribution of education levels among workers in the occupa-
tion. Then wematch observed occupations in the NLSY79 to a required level of education
based on their 3-digit occupation code. 125 out of 488 occupations are observed less than
100 times in our CPS pooled sample. In order to reduce the sampling variance of the
corresponding required levels of education, we collapse these low-frequency occupations
using 2-digit codes rather than 3-digit codes before applying the procedure described
above. Less than 2% of our NLSY79 observations are in such occupations.
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